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Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) have potentially unlimited applications in the future.
Therefore, establishing a viable and secure wireless network routing protocol for these
networks is essential. Currently, these networks are being used in connecting large sections
of cities by setting upwireless routers at strategic points all around the city. These networks
can also support connecting remote areas of the country, instead of having to lay a cable
all the way. The nature of applications mentioned above make these networks prone to
different attacks. Thus, security of these networks is a serious concern. In this paper, we
study the impact of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on WMNs. We base our
work on the existing Optimized Link State Routing protocol (OLSR) and we weave in
concepts of Learning Automata (LA) to protect the network from this kind of attack. The
simulation results for the proposed scheme show that the proposed protocol is effective in
the prevention of DDoS attacks in WMNs.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Security is one of the primary concerns that arise due to the open nature of WMNs. Security flaws in WMNs make them
prone to attacks. These attacks are intentionally undertaken to cripple a network. The objective of such attacks may be to
gain administrative control over the network or may be simply to disrupt the services provided by it.
WMNs aim at guaranteeing connectivity [1]. These networks are used to build a multihop wireless backbone to allow
interconnectivity of isolated Local Area Networks (LANs). The backbone routers remain predominantly stationary, while the
mobile nodes are allowed to maintain mobility of varying degrees amongst them.
Due to the open nature ofWMNs, these networks are susceptible to various kinds of attacks. Physical threats [2] can arise
due to the improper placing of the routers; resource depletion attack, tempering, wormhole attack [3], ‘black hole’ attack [4],
rushing attack [5,6], and SRP (Secure Routing Protocol) attack [7] are examples of other attacks that may be faced.
The objective of our work is to defend a server from a DDoS attack. In this section, we first explain the characteristics of
a DDoS attack. Subsequently, we explain techniques that may be used to combat this unwanted situation.
1.1. DDoS attacks
The main goal of a Denial of Service (DoS) attack is to flood the network with service requests to the server. This can lead
to the server being unable to service all the requests, thereby denying offering service to legitimate requests. A DoS attack
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frommultiple agents attacking the network from various locations constitutes a DDoS. The objective of the routing protocol
presented in this paper is to, initially, detect a DoS attack and, if one is detected, take the necessary actions to minimize the
number of service requests to the server coming from the attacking hosts, thereby preventing a DoS.
These attacks cripple the server because the server can handle only a fixed volume of requests at a particular time.When
the number of requests received by the server exceeds the server’s threshold capacity, its response time increases. As the
intensity of the attack increases, the server becomes incapable of servicing any requests. Further, any request being serviced
is mostly likely to be a rogue one. This leads to legitimate users being denied access to the server.
1.2. Related works
There are many works that introduce novel ways to tackle this potentially network crashing problem. Wellons et al. [8]
proposed an oblivious routing pattern for considering traffic dynamics and uncertainty in the mesh network routing
optimization. Mao et al. [9] described how the community understands DDoS attacks through backscatter measurement
techniques, which have limitations in terms of applicability in the present day Internet. They proposed a swift and seamless
shift to direct techniques of attack measurement.
Another approach for securing WMNs, proposed by Li et al. [10], adopts a stochastic security method by using a saddle
routing policy. The saddle routing policy-based approach demonstrates a way to increase the throughput by choosing a
multipath routing mechanism for known source and destination nodes. They model the problem as a two-player game,
between the routing policy maker and the attacker, by proposing a multipath routing protocol that reacts differently to
different scenarios.
Lue et al. [11] used an unsupervised learning approach to tackle the DDoS problem. The packet flow is analyzed by a
procedure called feature analysis, thereby producing a traffic-based metric; further an outlier algorithm detects the noisy
data and the intrusion decision is taken on the basis of the results of the earlier phase.
Beitollahi et al. [12] categorized the kinds of DDoS attacks, split into two techniques — reactive and proactive. Reactive
techniques monitor traffic at a particular target location, and use filtering techniques such as ingress, egress and distributed
packet filtering. Ingress filtering checks all the received packets’ source addresses and blocks those packets that lie outside
the router’s ingress address range. Proactive techniques include the use of rate control, location hiding, and heuristic
techniques. Location hiding is regarded as one of the ways that could be used to develop a complete solution to DDoS [13].
It hides the application’s IP address so that malicious users cannot target it in case of a DDoS attack.
Mopari et al. [14] proposed amethod for detecting aDDoS attack and defending against a particular type of attack, namely
IP spoofing, by maintaining an IP–hop count table and analyzing it (a hop count filter) to detect malicious packets and drop
them. Tupakula et al. [15] discuss the effect of TCP SYN and reflection DDoS attacks by preventing the attacker traffic from
passing through the ingress router that is nearest to the attack source.
Vrizlynn et al. [16] describe a non-intrusive IP traceback scheme using non-attack conditions to build and maintain a
database of valid source addresses traversing the edge routers.
Islam et al. [17] in their work mention the importance of not only the technique of defending against an attack, but also
the spatial deployment of detection systems. They show that the ideal way of completely eliminating a DDoS attack is to
sample at every node—but that would be impractical—thereby depending on the apt arrangement of detecting systems such
that no packet reaches the server without being sampled at least once.
Gupta et al. [18] proposed amethod inwhich propagation of sudden traffic changes inside the public domain ismonitored
to combat various DDoS attackmethods. This scheme realizes how precious thememory and the processing that is involved
in single-point sampling are, and thus delegates the work to nodes towards the edges of the network, thereby facilitating in
the quick removal of rogue packets.
Goldstein et al. [19] illustrated that DDoS attack defense systems usually generate filter rules to block malicious packets.
They propose a method involving traffic shaping wherein the amount of bandwidth allotted to a user is defined by the
probability of the user being legal.
The objective of the work reported in this paper was to develop a new routing protocol called DLSR, which prevents
DDoS attack using concepts based on intelligent learning using automata. The main contributions of the paper include the
following:
• Development of a routing protocol to prevent DDoS attacks in WMNs.
• Introduction of LA-based components into the routing architecture for efficient detection of malicious service requests.
• Proposal of two new frame formats and development of the handling mechanism.
• Proposal of a new algorithm for determining the route to the destination in the case of a DDoS attack.
• Experimental evaluation of the proposed protocol.
2. Learning Automata
Learning Automata (LA) provides a mathematical model for an automated system whose choice of next action depends
on the result of its previous actions. Learning automata have three major components — the environment, the set of actions
and the system (see Fig. 1).
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Fig. 1. The learning automaton.
In LA, the systemperformswithout any knowledge of the environment. In otherwords, from the viewpoint of the system,
the environment is random in nature. The system performs an action on this random environment. Depending on the
response from the environment, the system decides its next action. This process of adapting its action using the ‘knowledge’
that it gains is known as ‘learning’. The response from the network may be either positive or negative.
A comprehensive overview of LA can be found in the classic text by Narendra and Thathachar [20], and in the recent book
chapter by Oommen andMisra [21]. Examples of applications of LA in the domain of networks include [22–27,30–36]. Before
elaborating on our proposed solution, we feel it is necessary to provide an understanding of the mathematical formalisms
in the definitions of the automaton and the environment in LA.
2.1. The automaton
• The learning automaton can be represented as a quintuple represented as {Q , A, B, F ,H}, where [24]:
• Q is the finite set of internal states Q = {q1, q2, q3 . . . .qn}where qn is the state of the automaton at instant n.• A is a finite set of actions performed by the automaton. A = {α1, α2 . . . .αn} where αn is the action performed by the
automaton at instant n.
• B is a finite set of responses from the environment. B = {β1, β2, β3 . . . βn}whereβn is the response from the environment
at an instant n.
• F is a mapping function. It maps the current state and input to the next state of the automaton. Q × B→ Q .
• H is a mapping function. It maps the current state and response from the environment to determine the next action to
be performed.
2.2. The environment
The environment corresponds to the medium in which the automaton functions. Mathematically, an environment can
be abstracted as a triple {A, B, C}. A, B, and C are defined as follows [24]:
• A = {α1, α2, . . . , αr} represents a finite input set;• B = {β1, β2, . . . , βl} is the output set of the environment; and• C = {c1, c2, . . . , cr} is a set of penalty probabilities, where element ci ∈ C corresponds to an input action αi.
We now provide a few important definitions used in the field of LA. Given an action probability vector P (t) at time t , the
average penalty is defined as [24]
M(t) = E [β(t)|P(t)] = Pr [β(t) = 1|P(t)]
=
r∑
i=1
Pr
[
β(t) = 1|α(t) = αi
]× Pr [α(t) = αi]
=
r∑
i=1
cipi(t). (1)
The average penalty for the ‘‘pure-chance’’ automaton is given by [24]
M0 = 1r
r∑
i=1
ci. (2)
As t →∞, if the average penaltyM(t) < M0, at least asymptotically, the automaton is generally considered to be better
than the pure-chance automaton. E[M(t)] is given by [24]
E [M(t)] = E {E [β(t)|P(t)]} = E [β(t)] . (3)
3. The systemmodel
A wireless mesh network is formed of a collection of independent wireless radio transmitters. In this paper, we consider
a wireless mesh scenario with multiple nodes. The server or service provider is connected to one of the nodes. Any of the
other nodes may request services from the server (Fig. 2).
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Fig. 2. A wireless mesh network.
Fig. 3. LA system model.
Eachwireless mesh node employs LA for the detection and removal of malicious packets passing through it. Our protocol
associates a sampling budget with each node. The network traffic might contain malicious packets and this is passed to the
LA systemwhich samples the input based on the remaining budget. If a malicious packet is detected, it is dropped. Since the
LA system only checks a portion of the packets being passed through it, somemalicious packets may pass through this node
undetected. These packets will be detected by subsequent nodes as they traverse the network (Fig. 3).
4. DLSR: A DDoS preventing optimized link state routing protocol
Asmentioned earlier, the principal objective of the DLSR protocol is to prevent a DDoS attack fromdisrupting the services
provided by the server. DLSR is a modification of the existing OLSR protocol [28]. The functioning of the DLSR protocol
comprises the following three phases:
• DDoS detection.
• Attack identification
• DDoS defense mechanism.
4.1. DDoS detection
In order to service a client’s request, the server will need to allocate resources to the client. The resources of the server
are limited. When the server does not have enough resources to allocate to service a request, a DoS occurs.
To analyze a DDoS attack, it is required that we fix a maximum service capacity for the server. When the number of
service requests exceeds this limit the server is incapable of providing the service and this thus leads to DoS. We consider
the server capacity in terms of the number of service requests that the server is capable of servicing within a unit of time.
We assume that all service requests are identical.
We also define a service threshold for the server as a percentage of the server’s service capacity. If the number of service
requests is above the service threshold then there is a possibility that DoS may ensue. So long as the number of service
requests is below the service capacity of the server, a DoS will not occur.
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In the DDoS detection phase, the server monitors incoming traffic. If the server finds that the service threshold is
exceeded, the server sends an alert message (DALERT) to all the nodes in the network. Upon receiving this alert, the nodes
go into the attack identification mode (phase 2), while the server continues to monitor and service all requests. The alert
message frame format, contents and handling algorithms are discussed in Section 5.1
In essence, the DDoS detection phase is mainly performed at the server by analysis of incoming traffic. It should be duly
noted that in this phase all other nodes simply function as OLSR nodes. No special actions are performed. It is also important
to note that the start of the attack identification phase does not confirm an attack butmerely indicates the possibility of one.
4.2. The attack identification phase
Upon receiving the alert message (DALERT), the nodes are aware that a server in the network is on the verge of DoS. From
the DALERT message (Section 5.1), the node is able to identify the server’s IP address. At such an instant, all nodes are only
aware of the possibility of a DoS, but have no information of the attacker(s). In order to gain information about the attacker,
the nodes begin to sample the incoming data and make a note of the hosts that are requesting services from the server. Any
host trying to execute a DoS attack on the server will send significantly more service requests than any other host. From the
information obtained during the sampling process, the nodes can determine the IP addresses of the malicious hosts.
If any node identifies that one or more hosts are trying to execute a DoS attack, then all nodes are alerted about this. The
attacker’s information is sent using an Attacker Information Packet (AIP). The AIP contains the IP addresses of all hosts that
have been found trying to execute a DoS attack. Upon receiving this packet, all nodes go into the DDoS defense phase. This
asserts that the server is under attack and DoS can ensue. The AIP is described in Section 5.2.
4.3. The DDoS defense phase
The server experiences high load, close to its service capacity. All the nodes are informed of this. Some node(s) assert(s)
that the network is under attack. The IP address of the attacker has been identified and this information has been conveyed
to all other nodes. If the attack is distributed in nature, multiple sources are identified.
The DDoS defense phase starts on a node when it receives an AIP. In this phase, the nodes continue to sample incoming
traffic. The node discards packets coming from the identified host(s), continues tomonitor traffic flow, and identify any new
attackers. If any are found, then the node sends this information using the AIP.
The discarding of packets from identified attackers helps in reducing the number of service requests (that reach the
server) and, thus, reducing the load on the server. This, in turn, reduces the possibility of a DoS attack.
It is possible that the attacker uses a false IP address, which might belong to a legitimate user. One can argue that the
dropping of packets would result in the genuine user being denied access. However, keeping in mind that our goal is to
prevent the server from crashing, we sacrifice the user whose IP address has been spoofed and keep the server functioning.
The sampling of packets by the nodes consumes energy, and causes a small amount of latency in the network. Therefore,
it ismandatory thatwe associate a costwith this sampling procedure.We assume that each node has a sampling budget. This
budget can be visualized as the maximum number of packets that a node can sample per unit time. Continuously sampling
atmaximumbudget is not a very energy efficient solution. It is ideal to adjust the rate of sampling on the basis of the number
of malicious service requests that pass through the node. Depending on the location of the attackers, the paths taken by the
attacker’s packets will be different. There is a need for an intelligent system that understands the pattern of the attack and
samples the interface in an optimizedmanner. In this paper, we suggest the use of LA [20,21], briefly presented in Section 2,
to model the intelligent sampling system.
It is important to note that the sampling of x packets at a node will not guarantee that all the packets from the attacking
host will be identified and discarded. Only a certain fraction of the total DoS attack packets will be caught.
In order to increase the probability of detection and removal of malicious DoS attack packets, the proposed routing
algorithm will route the packets such that they traverse a greater number of nodes before reaching the server. This helps
to reduce the number of malicious service requests that reach the server. As each packet traverses through more nodes, the
probability of detecting the malicious packets increases. There needs to be a limit by which the length of the path can be
increased. This limit and the algorithm for routing the packets in this phase are discussed in Section 5.3.
The sketch of the system functionalities is presented in Fig. 4.
5. Frame formats
5.1. The DALERT packet
We propose a new routing message called DALERT (DDoS Alert). The frame format for DALERT is shown in Fig. 5.
TheDALERTpacket is transmitted by the serverwhen it feels that the network is under threat. The purpose of thismessage
is to alert all nodes in the network of the possibility of an attack. The DALERTmessage provides information about the server
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Fig. 4. Sketch of system functionalities.
0 8 16 24 32
DALERT Information Server Capacity
Server Address
DALERT Packet Header
Fig. 5. DALERT frame format.
experiencing high load. It contains a field for DALERT information which can take two values: either 0 or 1, 1 signifying that
there is an imminent threat and 0 meaning that there is no threat at the present time. The server capacity field contains
an integer that signifies the amount of requests that a server can handle at a given period of time. The server address field
contains the server’s IP address.
The ‘PROCESS DALERT’ algorithm is followed by the nodes when a DALERT packet is received.
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PROCESS DALERT
A DALERT message can be of two types. A value of 1 indicates that a large volume of packets is being sent to the server
and the server is on the verge of DoS. A value of 0 indicates that the server has recovered. Whenever a DALERT
message is received by a node:
1. Check the value present in the DALERT message.
2. If the value is 1:
(i) Set the DALERT information value of the node to 1.
(ii) Read the server’s IP address and capacity from the DALERT message and set the node’s server IP and
server capacity to the respective values.
3. Otherwise, reset the DALERT value to 0.
The ‘SEND DALERT’ algorithm is followed by the server when a DALERT packet needs to be sent.
SEND DALERT
A node needs to send a DALERT message if its DALERT value is set to 1.
1. If DALERT value is 1:
(i) Set the DALERT information in the DALERT message to 1.
(ii) Copy the server IP and the server capacity to the DALERT message.
2. Otherwise, set the DALERT value to 0.
3. Propagate the message to its neighbouring nodes.
5.2. The AIP
The message format for sending an identified Attacker IP (AIP) to all nodes is shown in Fig. 6. The AIP field contains the
potential attacker’s IP address.
The ‘PROCESS AIP’ algorithm is followed by the nodes when an AIP is received.
PROCESS AIP
Whenever an attacker is detected by a node, an AIP is propagated through the network. When a node receives such a
packet:
1. Retrieve the attackers IP address from the AIP.
2. Add the attackers IP address to a list containing all the attackers’ IP addresses. This serves to prevent a distributed
DoS attack by keeping track of multiple attackers attacking at the same time.
The ‘SEND AIP’ algorithm is used to by the server to send an AIP.
SEND AIP
1. When a node identifies that a certain IP address is sending more packets than a pre-defined percentage of the
server’s capacity, it recognizes this node as a potential attacker and adds the IP address to a list containing the IP
addresses of attackers.
2. Whenever a new attacker has been identified, this information is propagated to all other nodes using an AIP
message.
3. Add the new IP address of the attacker to an AIP message and send the message to its neighboring nodes.
5.3. The REQUEST ROUTE algorithm
REQUEST ROUTE
For every packet received at a node:
1. Find the routing table entry for the packets intended for that destination.
2. Find the routing table entry which specifies the next hop for forwarding the packet.
3. If the network is under a threat of a DDoS attack and the packet has not exhausted the number of times that it can
be
re-routed:
(i) Find a neighbour that is common to both the current node and the next hop node.
(ii) Change the next hop address of the packet to that of the node identified in the previous step.
4. Forward the packet to the next hop node.
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Table 1
Simulation parameters used in NS3.
Parameters Value
Channel helper YansWifiChannelHelper
Channel propagation delay ns3::ConstantSpeedPropagationDelayModel
Physical medium helper YansWifiPhyHelper::Default
Mac type AdhocWifiMac
Position allocator ns3::GridPositionAllocator
Min X 0
Min Y 0
Delta X 250
Delta Y 250
Grid width 5
Layout type RowFirst
Mobility model ns3::StaticMobilityModel
Table 2
Experimental parameters for Experiment 1.
Parameters Value
Number of service requests sent by attacker(s) 258
Rate of attack Constant one packet per second
Simulation time 500 s
LA reward parameter 0.1
LA penalization parameter 0.7
No. of mesh nodes 50
Server threshold 70%
Attack hops 10
0 8 16 24 32
Attacker IP
AIP Packet Header
Fig. 6. AIP frame format.
6. Experimental evaluation
The proposed protocol was simulated using the NS3 simulator [29]. Four sets of experiments were conducted to assess
the performance of DLSR. The performance of DLSR was compared with respect to OLSR [28]. The general parameters of the
simulation that were used in the experiments are presented in Table 1.
6.1. Experiment 1: Varying the server’s service capacity
In this experiment, we studied the performance of the network while varying the server’s service capacity. The
experimental parameters for this experiment are listed in Table 2.
Fig. 7 shows the number of service requests that were denied due to the successful execution of a DDoS attack. It should
be noted that the server capacity was set to low values compared to the rate of attack. The aim of this experiment was to
assess the performance of the DLSR protocol when the network is faced with an overwhelming attack.
The rate of attack in this experiment is set such that it will push the server into a denial of service attack long before the
DLSR nodes can identify the possible attackers. This will surely result in a DDoS attack.
It is important to note from Fig. 7 that as the server’s service capacity increases, the number of service requests that are
denied decreases. For example, when the server’s service capacitywas 20, the OLSR protocol denied 158 service requests and
the DLSR protocol denied 60 service requests. On the other hand, when the server’s service capacity was increased to 50, the
OLSR protocol denied only 33 service requests and DLSR denied only 14 service requests. Also, from Fig. 7, it is evident that
even in the case of an overwhelming attack, DLSR is capable of significantly reducing its effect on the server. If the server’s
service capacity is increased to higher values, then the DDoS can be completely prevented.
As the server’s service capacity increases, it is capable of servicing more requests. But if this increased service capacity is
used to service the attacker’s requests, then the server’s resources are wasted and this may also lead to a DoS.
In Fig. 8, we see that dropping of malicious service requests in DLSR helps in conserving the server’s resources. We see
that at a service capacity of 20, when using the OLSR protocol, the server serviced a total of 100 packets from the attacker,
while the DLSR protocol only serviced 60 requests. The remaining 40 service requests were removed by intermediate nodes.
Depending on the sampling budget of the intermediate nodes, a greater number of service requests from the attacker can
be removed from the network before it reaches the server.
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Fig. 7. Denied service requests.
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Fig. 8. Serviced attacker requests versus server capacity.
Table 3
Experimental parameters for Experiment 2.
Parameters Value
Rate of attack Constant one packet per second
Simulation time 500 s
LA reward parameter 0.1
LA penalization parameter 0.7
Service capacity 30
Server threshold 70%
Attack hops 10
6.2. Experiment 2: The impact of the network size
The aimof this experimentwas to study the effect of network size on the performance of DLSR protocol. The experimental
parameters for this experiment are presented in Table 3.
In Fig. 9, it can be seen that OLSR services the same number of nodes irrespective of the size of the network. This is due
to the fact that no matter how many nodes there are in the network, all the nodes simply send the packet along to the next
hop on its way to the destination. But in the case of DLSR, the nodes do not simply forward the packet. Each node checks
the originating IP address of the packet and discards it, if it belongs to an attacker. Since each node can sample only a fixed
number of requests, all the attacker’s packets cannot be discovered by one node. Each node along the route discovers and
discards some packets, thereby reducing the number of attacker requests that the server will be servicing. If the number of
nodes in a network is greater, the number of hops to the destination will also be greater. Hence, the discovery rate is greater,
thereby decreasing the number of attacker requests reaching the server. This is evident from Fig. 9. When the number of
nodes in the network was only 25, 100 requests were serviced by the server. When the number of nodes increased to 50,
only 81 packets were being serviced. This is due to the fact that there were more nodes in the path to the destination for
discovering and discarding the packets.
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Fig. 10. Denied service requests versus size of network.
Table 4
Experimental parameters for Experiment 3.
Parameters Value
Number of service requests sent by attacker(s) 258
Rate of attack Constant one packet per second
No. of nodes 50
Simulation time 500 s
LA reward parameter 0.1
LA penalization parameter 0.7
Service capacity 30
Server threshold 70%
Attack hops 10
It can be inferred from Fig. 10 that the server downtime is less in the case of DLSR than for OLSR. In the case of OLSR, since
the size of the network has no effect on the number of packets discovered and discarded, the number of packets reaching
the server when it is down is always a constant despite the network having more intermediate nodes.
DLSR, on the other hand, discards more packets as the size of the network increases. Since those packets do not reach the
server while it is close to its threshold or while it is down, the server is able to quickly recover and resume normal operation,
thereby decreasing the amount of time for which the server is down.
Fig. 10 shows that when there are 75 nodes in the network and the server goes down, 34 packets are received at the
server. But when there are 100 nodes in the network, only 23 packets are received when the server is down. This means that
the server is facing less downtime when there are 100 nodes as compared to 75 nodes in the network.
6.3. Experiment 3: Analysis of the packet dropping behavior of nodes
Experiment 3 was conducted to study the packet dropping behavior of the nodes in the network. In this experiment, the
attacker was installed on Node 1 and the server on Node 50 (see Table 4).
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Table 5
Experimental parameters for Experiment 4.
Parameters Value
Number of service requests sent by attacker(s) 258
Rate of attack Constant one packet per second
No. of nodes 50
Simulation time 500 s
LA reward parameter 0.1
LA penalization parameter 0.7
Service capacity 30
Server threshold 70%
Attack hops 10
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Fig. 12. Packet dropping behavior of nodes.
As the service requests travel through the network, they can get detected and discarded by the intermediate nodes.
Fig. 11 shows the packet dropping pattern for the intermediate nodes in the network. The figure shows the behavior when
the sample budget is set to 25 and also when it is set to 10.
The initial nodes in the path to the server have a higher probability of detecting malicious service requests. As an
increasing number of packets get dropped, the probability of detection of the rest of the service requests decreases.
The same can be noted from Fig. 11 for the case when the sample budget is 25. The high sampling budget allows the
earlier nodes in the path to detect more packets. For example, in Fig. 12, when the sample budget is 25, Nodes 6, 8 and 12
drop 21, 24 and 48 packets respectively. On the other hand, Nodes 24, 28 and 33 respectively drop only 6, 5 and 1 packet(s).
When the sample budget was reduced to 10, the detection and discarding of malicious service requests became more
evenly distributed. This is because now each node has a smaller sample budget and is not capable of detecting all malicious
service requests that pass through it.
6.4. Experiment 4: Varying the sampling budget
In Experiment 4 we studied the effect of the sampling budget on the network. Instead of considering the best case
scenario, we consider an overwhelming attack on the network, similar to that executed in Experiment 1. The experiment
has been modeled in such a way that the server will go into DoS at least once.
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The experimental parameters for this experiment are listed in Table 5.
Fig. 12 shows the total number of service requests that were sent by the attacker, and the fraction of those that were
serviced by the server. We see that as the sampling budget increased, the number of malicious requests serviced decreased.
When the sampling budget was 5, 139 out of the 258 requests were serviced. On the other hand, when the sampling budget
was increased to 25, only 60 out of the 258 packets were serviced. This shows that the higher the sample budget, the smaller
the amount of the server’s resources that are wasted.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a protocol to prevent DDoS attacks in a wireless mesh network. Our proposed protocol
intertwines LA concepts, thereby optimizing the packet sampling mechanism. We suggested two new frame formats.
We also evaluated the performance of the system using the NS3 simulator. It was observed that the proposed protocol
outperformed OLSR with respect to DDoS type attacks.
In the future, we intend to compare DLSR with other protocol developed for WMNs. We also intend to study different
attack scenarios in the future and test our solution in real-life environments. We are particularly keen to study the
performance of the proposed protocol when the number of nodes in the network is large.
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